

ANUNA RESEARCH COOPERATIVE · IEEE DAPPS 2026

did:crdt

Coordination-free decentralised identifiers via
signed CRDTs

Hugo O'Connor · Claire Barnes

What's a DID?

- A **Decentralised Identifier**, defined by a W3C spec
- A persistent digital identity controlled by the subject
- Spec defines a flexible interface; many implementations are possible
- Ties in with cryptographic verification for proof of ownership, mutation

```
did:crdt:123 → {  
  "id": "did:crdt:123",  
  "authentication": [{  
    "id": "did:crdt:123#keys-1",  
    "type": "JsonWebKey2020",  
    "controller": "did:crdt:123",  
    "publicKeyJwk": ...  
  }]  
}
```

What can DID Documents contain?

- **Subject identifier** (the only mandatory field)
- **Controller**: DIDs representing any entities that control this DID
- **Also known as**: other IDs representing the same subject
- **Verification methods**: associated public keys
- **Verification relationships**: authentication, assertion, capabilities...
- **Services**: pointers to other related URIs

What they **shouldn't** contain: personal information

What can they be used for?

- Persistent IDs for individuals (user accounts, etc.)
- Ephemeral/service-specific IDs for privacy
- Connecting to Verifiable Credentials
- IDs for physical products, components
- IDs for autonomous agents, processes

Existing DID types and limitations


APPROACH	HOW UPDATES WORK	LIMITATIONS
<code>did:key</code> , <code>did:peer</code>	freeze the document	no key rotation, updates
<code>did:ethr</code> , <code>did:sidetree</code>	ledger / anchored log	needs chain for finality, fees and latency
KERI, <code>did:webvh</code>	one totally ordered log	no partitioned updates

None allow updates without coordination

BACKGROUND - EXISTING METHODS

Why do these limitations matter?

MOTIVATING EXAMPLE: NATURAL DISASTER RECOVERY



Conflict-free Replicated Data Types

STATE-BASED CRDTS

- Eventual consistency without consensus
- Build our DID document from them and we get convergence for free
- Merge is commutative, associative, idempotent

EXAMPLE: GROW-ONLY SETS

```
    { }      Start with an empty set
  /   \
{a}  {a,b}  Nodes add distinct elements
  \   /
  {a,b}     Nodes merge state
```

How do we build a DID with CRDTs?

STATE COMPONENT	CRDT	WHY DO WE USE IT?
verificationMethod	2P-Set	Add & permanently revoke keys
service	ORSWOT	Can re-add removed services
deactivated	OR Latch	Deactivation is irrevocable
Other properties	LWW-map	Simple, though not ideal semantics

The product (tuple) of CRDTs is also a CRDT

How do we update over time?

STATE MERGE

- 'Classic' CRDT method
- Convergent merge of values
- Requires shipping full state
- No integrity trail

SIGNED DELTAS

- 'Custom' approach
- Only need to ship deltas
- Signed Merkle DAG, Byzantine-tolerant
- Works well with gossip networks

Kleppmann, [Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant](#)

The signed delta approach

FIELD	DESCRIPTION
<code>did</code>	The DID itself
<code>τ</code>	An HLC timestamp
<code>P</code>	The hashes of causal parent deltas
<code>op</code>	Operation (e.g. <code>Deactivate</code>)
<code>π</code>	Signature over the rest of the delta

A signed delta is a tuple


`$\langle did, \tau, P, op, \pi \rangle$`

There's a special genesis delta


- The DID is derived from a public key
- The first delta adds that key
- The HLC is zeroed and P is $\emptyset$

CRDTs converge, what about deltas?

We lean on the CALM theorem (Hellerstein & Alvaro)



Anti-entropy over the Merkle DAG



What do we defend against?

With gossip networks as the motivating example, Byzantine fault tolerance is crucial

- **Tampering/forgery**: all deltas are signed, including genesis
- **Replay attacks**: deltas are idempotent and commit to their causal history
- **Denial of Service**: Kleppmann's approach – assume honest nodes can communicate
- **Key compromise**: containment (revocation), not recovery (future work)

Note that this applies to signed deltas only, state merge is trusted

We come with code

<https://git.anuna.io/anuna-research/did-crdt>

- Rust, WASM-compatible core
- Iroh gossip protocol
- Extensive property-based tests for convergence

WRAPPING UP

Limitations and future work

Key tradeoff: no canonical current value (no total order)

CONCEPTUAL

- Key relationships treated naively
- Sybil resistance
- Checkpoint compaction
- Key compromise recovery
- HLC node ID collisions

PRACTICAL

- Durable persistence
- Discovery (DHT approach, with tradeoffs)
- W3C method specification & registration

QUESTIONS

Thank you

<https://git.anuna.io/anuna-research/did-crdt>

hugo@anuna.io · claire@anuna.io